Denial management programs typically live in the back office. Teams classify denials, route them for appeal, and report the trend line. But if the root cause sits in the OR - in how supplies are staged, how preference cards align with real procedural pace, and how variances are communicated in real time - no amount of retrospective analytics will prevent the next denial.
This has direct financial consequences. Sizing-driven authorization variances are particularly common in orthopedics, spine, wound care, and other implant-heavy service lines. Each preventable write-off represents net revenue the organization could have used to fund staffing, service lines, or patient financial support. For safety-net and community hospitals operating on thin margins, the stakes are amplified.
The insight also reframes who owns the fix. When the root cause is clinical workflow, the solution requires cross-functional partnership between revenue cycle and OR leadership, not a stronger appeals team.
Sergio Quiej, Patient Financial Services Support Manager at Adventist Health, described tracing a bulk category of authorization denials from dashboard to specific claim to specific charge. The pattern pointed to sizing variances on implants and supplies. Rather than stop there, he requested time in the surgery department and spent a full week observing across multiple service lines.
What he found was not a knowledge gap. Staff understood the preference cards. The problem was procedural pace. "We don't have much time. So when we go, it's just grab and go," staff told him. The item selected was often not the item authorized. Not because of intent, but because of proximity and speed.
His response was to design a live intervention. The circulating nurse would send the actual item number mid-procedure so that a downstream team member could begin payer outreach immediately, rather than waiting for the denial to appear weeks later. Within three months, the issue was reduced by half. Within six months, the operational case supported a 1.5 FTE addition in the surgery department - funded, in effect, by the write-offs the new process prevented.
Two operational lessons stand out. First, Quiej positioned himself explicitly as an observer, not an auditor. He spent days in the room before asking substantive questions, which allowed staff to speak candidly about the constraints they were working under. Second, he framed the fix around what the OR team actually needed - help with basic coverage so staff could take breaks and lunches - rather than around a rev cycle metric. That framing built the cross-functional buy-in required to change the workflow.